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OVERCRIMINALIZING IMMIGRATION
JENNIFER M. CHACÓN*
Although there is a burgeoning literature on the criminalization of
migration,1 immigration issues are not usually included in academic
conversations surrounding overcriminalization.2 Criminal law scholars may
not have been particularly attuned to developments in the world of
immigration law because they have understood it to be primarily the
domain of civil or administrative law.3 For most of U.S. history, this has
*

Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009) [hereinafter Managing Migration]; Jennifer M. Chacón,
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007) [hereinafter Unsecured Borders]; Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469
(2009); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control
After September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship &
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611
(2003); Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
2
Two recent symposia on the topic of overcriminalization, for example, have not
included any discussions dedicated to the topic of immigration enforcement. See Ellen S.
Podgor, Foreword, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 565 (2011) (describing the contributions to the
2010 George Mason symposium on overcriminalization); Ellen S. Podgor, Foreword:
Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005) (outlining the
contributions to the 2005 American University Washington College of Law symposium on
overcriminalization).
3
Supreme Court jurisprudence reinforces this divide, making it clear that deportation is
not a criminal punishment and that the procedural protections that apply in the criminal
realm do not apply to the administrative proceedings associated with the removal of
noncitizens. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (“This Court has long
understood that an ‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’” (quoting Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893))); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1039 (1984) (“The purpose of deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to
put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
730. But cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (recognizing that, because of
changes in the immigration laws, “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
1
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been the case. Or perhaps the failure to consider immigration law in
overcriminalization discussions has occurred because widespread
enforcement of criminal immigration laws is a relatively new phenomenon.4
Whatever the reasons, in an era when about half of all federal criminal
prosecutions are of immigration crimes,5 and when many states and
localities are enacting ordinances aimed at criminalizing offenses related to
migration,6 now is a good time to start including immigration policy in the
broader conversation on overcriminalization. Increasingly, our immigration
policy provides a paradigmatic example of overcriminalization, whereby
governments—both state and local—are creating “too many crimes and
criminaliz[ing] things that properly should not be crimes.”7 Like the war on
drugs before it, the growing war on unauthorized migration is suddenly and
dramatically being waged through the criminal justice system. The
distorting effects of this use of state and federal criminal justice systems are
only beginning to show.8 Therefore, it seems particularly critical for
scholars concerned with overcriminalization to take stock of recent
developments in immigration enforcement.
This Article argues that contemporary immigration policy is a site of
overcriminalization. To explain how this came to be the case, the Article
first evaluates the major developments in immigration law and immigration
enforcement that have increased the criminalization of immigration. In the
latter half of the twentieth century, three important assumptions
undergirded immigration enforcement. The first assumption was that the
federal government had the exclusive power to regulate immigration.9 The
plead guilty to specified crimes”). The Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky erodes some
of the significance of the civil–criminal divide, at least for purposes of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. For a discussion on the significance of Padilla, see, for example, Anita Ortiz
Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether
Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(2011). For a discussion of the difficulties experienced by state courts—many of which have
been heretofore unfamiliar with the distinct legal sphere of immigration law—in
implementing Padilla, see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, When State Courts Meet
Padilla: A Concerted Effort Is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on Crime-Based
Immigration Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299 (2011).
4
See discussion infra Part II.
5
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2009, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009], available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
6
See discussion infra Part III.
7
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over Administrative Law, 7
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 657 (2011).
8
See discussion infra Part IV.
9
See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M.
RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, at x (5th ed. 2009).
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second was that, although it was essentially the sole responsibility of the
federal government to make and enforce immigration laws, the federal
government was actually unable to achieve widespread enforcement of the
federal immigration laws on the books.10 And the third assumption was that
state and local governments not only had no role in the regulation of
immigration, but also had very little to do with the enforcement of federal
immigration law.11 Of course, these three general statements stand in for a
more nuanced set of facts on the ground, but at a basic level, they generate a
fairly accurate picture of the state of immigration enforcement as recently
as fifteen years ago.12
Over the past fifteen years, however, all three of these assumptions
have given way to new realities. This Article describes the transformation
of these three fundamental assumptions of immigration law and discusses
the new realities that have replaced them. It also explains how the resulting
changes in the underlying structure of immigration law and its enforcement
have increased significantly the use of the criminal law as a means to effect
immigration control. Part I discusses the apparent decline of federal
10
See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, Chaos at the Gates: Porous Deportation System Gives
Criminals Little to Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at A1. With the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress intended to normalize the status of a
significant percentage of the unauthorized population (then estimated at four to six million),
and to enforce the law so as to prevent the future development of a sizeable unauthorized
population in the future. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 9, at 1158. But by 1995, the
government’s estimated unauthorized population was again at around five million. U.S.
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000, at 10 (2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf. Researchers
estimate that the number of unauthorized migrants had grown to around ten million by 2004.
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL FIX, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND
FIGURES 1 (2004) (estimating the undocumented population at 9.3 million), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf.
11
See Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption,
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 34 (2007)
(“[S]tate, county, and local ordinances aimed at regulating general immigration functions are
unconstitutional as a function of exclusive federal preemptory powers.”); Michael J.
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1084, 1089 (2004) (“[O]n the whole, enforcement of the immigration statutes has
traditionally been the province of federal immigration officials.”). But see Clare Huntington,
The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792
(2008) (arguing that “immigration is more like areas of constitutional law that involve a mix
of federal and state authority”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997) (observing and celebrating the fact that
“states are emerging as major players in immigration law- and policy-making”).
12
See, e.g., Sontag, supra note 10; INS ‘Enforcement Deficit’ Tied to Law, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1995, at A3; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 9, at 1148–52 (describing
increased resources devoted to border enforcement as a development of the mid-1990s and
increased interior enforcement as an even more recent development).
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exclusivity in immigration regulation and the rise of state and local
legislation—particularly state criminal laws—aimed at controlling
migration.
Part II discusses the significant expansion of federal
immigration enforcement efforts and, in particular, the recent dramatic rise
in the use of federal criminal sanctions as a means of enforcing immigration
laws. Part III discusses the rise of state and local participation in the
enforcement of federal immigration laws and the consequent increase in the
policing of low-level state criminal offenses in certain communities.
While no one would dispute that the criminalization of migration has
increased over the past decade,13 this leaves open the question of whether
this is an appropriate policy response or whether the resulting policies can
be described as overcriminalization. Therefore, the final section of the
paper explains why these policies constitute overcriminalization and
suggests alternative approaches to immigration enforcement specifically
and to immigration policy more generally.

13
At least two other shifts in immigration policies can be said to have increased the
criminalization of migration. The first is that, through legislation enacted in 1988, 1994, and
especially in 1996, Congress has significantly expanded the immigration consequences of
criminal offenses. In other words, for noncitizens, the list of crimes that can result in
expulsion (or inadmissibility) has significantly expanded. This has tightened the link
between criminal law and immigration enforcement. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose
Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–23 (2007) (describing the relevant legislative enactments of 1988,
1994, and 1996). Most notably, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) greatly expanded the definition of what constitutes an “aggravated felony” for
purposes of immigration law. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)). Second, the nominally civil immigration
system has increasingly assumed the punitive features of the criminal law system, but
without the procedural protections that generally apply in criminal proceedings. See Anil
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 47–50 (2010)
(discussing the “excesses” of immigration detention); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path
of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (“Those features of the criminal justice model that can roughly be
classified as enforcement have indeed been imported [to the civil immigration system].
Those that relate to adjudication—in particular, the bundle of procedural rights recognized in
criminal cases—have been consciously rejected . . . . [I]mmigration law has been absorbing
the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model while
rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime.”).
I discuss the administrative immigration detention issue as part of a broader discussion
on the expansion of federal immigration enforcement. See discussion infra Part II. Because
the first trend does not fit neatly within the rubric of “overcriminalization,” I do not dedicate
extensive space to that discussion. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the
problems of overcriminalization discussed herein are understated insofar as they only
partially account for the increasingly punitive administrative processes aimed at noncitizens.
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I. THE DECLINE OF FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN THE REGULATION OF
IMMIGRATION
Over the past two decades, states and localities have become
increasingly active in regulating immigration, defying the notion that
immigration regulation is a power exclusively reserved to the federal
government. This Part begins by explaining how, over the past 150 years,
federal courts generally struck down sub-federal efforts to regulate
immigration and articulated a very narrow set of parameters within which
states would be allowed to regulate immigration. Next, this Part discusses
how states and localities recently have enacted a number of provisions—
primarily criminal provisions—to indirectly regulate migration. States and
localities often have been forthcoming about the fact that these provisions
are designed to affect immigration, for example by achieving “attrition [of
unauthorized migrants] through enforcement” of these laws.”14 Rather than
striking all of these laws down as impermissible, however, courts have
given states a surprising amount of latitude to regulate noncitizens through
their substantive criminal laws and criminal law enforcement.15 Finally,
this Part critiques states’ increasing reliance on the criminal law as a tool to
address the issue of migration, notwithstanding the fact that immigration
generally poses little or no threat to public safety or security.16 Ironically,
sub-federal criminal law is increasingly used to manage a problem that has
never been, at root, a criminal law problem.17

14

Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070), ch. 113, § 1,
2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450 [hereinafter S.B. 1070].
15
See discussion infra at Part I.B.
16
RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM.
IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF
ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 6–8 (2007),
available at http://www.cata-farmworkers.org/english%20pages/Myth.pdf (noting much
lower incarceration rates among immigrants than among similarly situated native-born
citizens); Corina Graif & Robert J. Sampson, Spatial Heterogeneity in the Effects of
Immigration and Diversity on Neighborhood Homicide Rates, 13 HOMICIDE STUD. 242, 243
(2009) (noting that “research has largely found an insignificant or negative link between
immigrant status and crime” and, in an original study, finding no correlation or an inverse
correlation between immigrant concentrations and homicide rates); Kristen F. Butcher &
Ann Morrison Piehl, Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on
Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation 26–27 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 2005-19, 2005), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/
publications/working_papers/2005/wp2005_19.pdf (finding that immigrants are a selfselecting group that tends to have a lower crime rate than the native-born population).
17
See discussion infra at Part I.C.
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A. THE RISE OF FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN THE REGULATION OF
IMMIGRATION

The notion that the federal government has exclusive power to regulate
immigration is fairly well-established as a matter of constitutional law. It is
certainly true that in the early days of the nation, including much of the
nineteenth century, sub-federal entities actively regulated immigration.18
Many states had laws barring entry to paupers, individuals with certain
diseases, and racially undesirable groups.19 These barriers to entry applied
not just to immigrants from other countries, but also to migrants from other
states.20 States also sought to control the composition of their populations
in other ways, including through the imposition of head taxes on
immigrants.21
It was in the context of the latter sort of initiative that the Supreme
Court first began to chip away at sub-federal immigration regulation. In
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, the Supreme Court declared that only
Congress could regulate migration through the imposition of head taxes.22
In the decades that followed, the federal government increasingly
centralized immigration control. In 1875, Congress enacted the first
restrictive federal immigration law—the Page Act—which prohibited the
entry of immigrants deemed undesirable, including certain contract laborers
and women who entered with the intent of engaging in prostitution.23 The
law was clearly designed and enforced so as to restrict entry of Chinese
immigrants in the face of growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the western
United States.24 Indeed, Congress followed up the Page Act with the
enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.25 In the case upholding
the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court made sweeping

18
See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (1993).
19
Id. at 1883 (“[S]tate immigration law in the century preceding 1875 included five
major categories: regulation of the migration of convicts; regulation of persons likely to
become or actually becoming a public charge; prevention of the spread of contagious
diseases, including maritime quarantine and suspension of communication by land; and
regionally varying policies relating to slavery, including prohibition of the slave trade, bans
on the migration of free blacks, and the seamen’s acts.”).
20
See id. at 1834; see also Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century
Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009).
21
Neuman, supra note 18, at 1850, 1855, 1858; see also Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S.
580, 586 (1884); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 261 (1875).
22
92 U.S. at 274.
23
Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (repealed 1974).
24
See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 647, 691, 702, 710 (2005).
25
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
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statements about the broad power of Congress to regulate immigration,
writing:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by
the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one. The powers of government are delegated in trust to
26
the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties.

Over time, the statement of absolute power over immigration law was
construed to limit to the federal government the power to regulate entry and
exit.27 The Court made it clear that while a state could act within its
traditional spheres of state power, such as licensing of businesses, it could
do so only to the extent that any indirect regulation of immigration did not
conflict with the federal immigration scheme. In DeCanas v. Bica, the
Court therefore upheld a California statute prohibiting the employment of
unauthorized immigrants because at that time, there was no comprehensive
scheme for regulating the employment of such workers.28 But generally,
the Court rather jealously protected the prerogative of the federal
government in immigration enforcement.29
Even when policies aimed at noncitizens did not expressly contravene
federal immigration law, the Court was willing to strike down state efforts
to regulate noncitizens to the extent they were deemed insufficiently
complementary of congressional objectives. This was obviously the case in
Hines v. Davidowitz, where a Pennsylvania law that did not conflict with
federal law was deemed preempted simply because the federal government
occupied the field,30 for example. But the Court also applied a similar
analysis to a Texas law that would have required undocumented immigrant
26

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (“The passage of laws which concern the admission of
citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the
States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the
character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the
national government. If it be otherwise, a single state can, at her pleasure, embroil us in
disastrous quarrels with other nations.”).
27
The following three paragraphs draw from and elaborate upon a brief discussion in
Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J., at Part I (forthcoming 2013).
28
424 U.S. 351 (1976).
29
See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (“[W]here the federal
government . . . has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a
standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of
Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce
additional or auxiliary regulations.”).
30
Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67.
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students to pay for their education in public elementary and high schools in
Plyler v. Doe.31 The Court struck the law down as a violation of those
students’ right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.32
Since the Texas law did not create new categories of authorized and
unauthorized migrants, and since it regulated an area—education—long
understood to be the prerogative of the states,33 it would be possible to
imagine that the Court might uphold the regulation as a lawful regulation of
noncitizens, operating permissibly and complementarily in the interstices of
federal immigration law. But that is not what happened. Instead, in Plyler
v. Doe, the Court wrote:
As we recognized in DeCanas v. Bica, the States do have some authority to act with
respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and
furthers a legitimate state goal. In DeCanas, the State’s program reflected Congress’
intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of
permission to work in this country. In contrast, there is no indication that the
disability imposed by [the Texas statute] corresponds to any identifiable congressional
policy. The State does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources
was ever a congressional concern in restricting immigration. More importantly, the
classification reflected in [the Texas statute] does not operate harmoniously within the
34
federal program.

The reasoning of Plyler clarifies that even when states pass laws in a
domain of traditional state power like education, the constitutionality of
those laws is not assured simply because the law does not conflict with
federal law. Instead, Plyler suggests that to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, a state law that creates unique obligations or disabilities for
noncitizens—including undocumented noncitizens—must further a
legitimate state goal, correspond to a specific, identifiable congressional
policy, and operate harmoniously with federal immigration regulation.
In short, from the 1880s through the 1980s, the Supreme Court made it
clear that Congress controlled federal immigration policy. States could
only act indirectly to manage migration, and only when such actions fell
within the traditional scope of their power and where such actions were
“harmonious” with federal policy. Over the past few years, however,
scholars and policymakers have raised new challenges to the notion of
federal exclusivity in the realm of immigration policy. This, in turn, has
given rise to a preemption jurisprudence that is more accepting of subfederal immigration regulations, including regulations that are not
31
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); see also id. at 237 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
32
Id., at 230 (majority opinion).
33
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981), invalidated by Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 230–31.
34
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225–26 (citations omitted).
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completely harmonious with federal regulations.
B. THE CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN IMMIGRATION
REGULATION

A wave of state and local immigration ordinances is sweeping across
the nation. In recent years, thousands of local governments around the
country have debated or enacted ordinances designed to restrict the ability
of unauthorized migrants to live and work in their communities.35 One
high-profile example comes from the town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania,
where local officials enacted an ordinance that prohibited landlords from
renting to noncitizens present without legal authorization and also allowed
for the revocation of the business licenses of any business owner who
employed an unauthorized worker.36 Other localities have enacted narrower
provisions—such as regulations designed to deter day laborers from
soliciting work in public spaces.37
States have also joined the fray. In 1994, California voters passed
Proposition 187,38 a measure aimed at curbing undocumented migration to
the state through the elimination of state benefits (including, fatally for the
law, public K–12 education).39 That law was quickly enjoined by a federal
district court40 and languished when the state’s governor declined to pursue
the state’s legal defense of the law in court.41 Fifteen years later, however,
the country once again witnessed the rise of state ordinances that, while
35

MONICA W. VARSANYI, TAKING LOCAL CONTROL 3 (2010) (“In 2006, 500 bills were
considered, 84 of which became law. In 2007, 1,562 immigration- and immigrant-related
pieces of legislation were introduced, and 240 became law. And most recently, in 2009,
approximately 1,500 laws and resolutions were considered in all 50 state legislatures, and
353 were ultimately enacted.”); Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 49 (2010); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 570 (2008).
36
Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006); see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176
(3d Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
37
See, e.g., REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-7.1601 (2010); see also
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952,
955 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
38
1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (approved by electors Nov. 8, 1994).
39
Id. at A-317, § 1.
40
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
41
Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/29/news/
mn-60700 (“Attorneys for Gov. Gray Davis and civil rights organizations have reached an
agreement to end the litigation surrounding Proposition 187, effectively killing the landmark
1994 ballot referendum that targeted illegal immigrants and became a pivotal juncture in
California’s political life.”).
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purportedly crafted to avoid the constitutional problems encountered by
Proposition 187’s education provisions, actually sweep far beyond the
scope of Proposition 187 in other respects.
Over the last five years, lawmakers have proposed more than 7,000
state immigration proposals.42 While ordinances such as the Legal Arizona
Workers Act (LAWA) are narrowly aimed at denying business licenses to
employers who hire unauthorized workers,43 many states have recently
enacted much broader ordinances designed to regulate the employment of,
housing for, policing of, and benefits available to undocumented
immigrants.
The Arizona legislature ignited a national firestorm when it enacted a
bill—signed into law by Governor Jan Brewer on April 23, 2010—that
greatly expanded the role Arizona’s state and local officials play in the
enforcement of immigration law.44 The Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act,45 often referred to as S.B. 1070, effectively sought
to impose criminal liability based on undocumented presence in the United
States. Although proponents of the law argued that it mirrors federal
immigration law,46 this was clearly not the case. Among other things, the
law made state criminal offenses out of violations that were formally crimes
only at the federal level47 and criminalized conduct that is neither a civil nor
a criminal violation under federal law.48
42
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND
RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1–DEC. 7, 2011) 2 (no publication date), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2011ImmFinalReportDec.pdf.
43
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -214 (Supp. 2011); see also Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (upholding the constitutionality
of LAWA).
44
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html.
45
Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450.
46
See Gabriel J. Chin & Marc Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of
Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 252 (2011) (discussing the “mirror
image” theory of sub-federal immigration enforcement and arguing that even the criminal
provisions that “mirror” federal immigration law are unconstitutional).
47
Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (Supp. 2011) (criminalizing “willful
failure to complete or carry an alien registration document”), with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e),
1306(a) (2006) (criminalizing similar violations as federal misdemeanors). The Supreme
Court has found previous state efforts to enact alien registration schemes that run parallel to
the federal scheme unconstitutional. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
48
Chin et al., supra note 35, at 50. Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C)
(making it a crime for an “unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a
public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state”), with 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006) (prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized
workers but containing no provision criminalizing a worker’s act of soliciting or performing
work). I have written a more detailed analysis of S.B. 1070 and the Supreme Court
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S.B. 1070 also “imposes new duties and creates new powers designed
to increase [state and local law enforcement’s] investigation of immigration
status, arrests of removable individuals, reporting of undocumented
immigrants to federal authorities, and assistance in removal by delivering
removable noncitizens to federal authorities.”49 Major provisions of the law
were enjoined by U.S. District Court Judge Bolton, and the injunction was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and largely upheld by the
Supreme Court, with a significant exception.50 While the case was pending
review in the Supreme Court, other states, including Utah,51 Alabama,52 and
South Carolina,53 enacted provisions that looked very similar to Arizona’s
S.B. 1070.
Alabama enacted immigration regulations that not only mirrored some
of Arizona’s controversial provisions, but also extended far beyond
anything that Arizona tried to do. Indeed, Alabama’s H.B. 56 is the most
draconian state regulation to be enacted in the period before the Supreme
Court’s consideration of the Arizona law. It not only would have restricted
jurisprudence up to and including the challenge to this law in Chacón, supra note 27. I draw
upon that work in my discussions of S.B. 1070, United States v. Arizona, and Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting in this Subpart.
49
Chin et al., supra note 35, at 62.
50
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d
339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(2012). The Supreme Court reversed the injunction of S.B. 1070’s Section 2, which requires
law enforcement officials to investigate immigration status upon arrest and, when practicable
during a lawful stop, upon reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation. Arizona, 132 S.
Ct. at 2510–11.
51
Marjorie Cortez, Utah Gov. Gary Herbert Signs Immigration Bills into Law, DESERET
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705368733/Utah-GovGary-Herbert-signs-immigration-bills-into-law.html (discussing Utah’s enactment of a
moderate form of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, along with an attempted state-level guest worker
program).
52
Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (H.B. 56), 2011 Ala.
Laws [hereinafter H.B. 56]. Several of the major provisions of this bill have been enjoined.
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (enjoining provisions including
those relating to alien registration; criminalization of working without authorization;
employer sanctions; invalidation of the enforcement of contracts with unauthorized migrants;
and prohibition on applications for identity cards and licenses). For a critique of the
Alabama law that situates the law in a larger historical and cultural context, see Kevin R.
Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the “New” Birmingham the Same as the “Old”
Birmingham?, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2013).
53
S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-170 (2008), amended by Act of June 27, 2011, No. 69, 2011
S.C. Acts; see also Reid J. Epstein, Haley OKs S.C. Immigration Cops, POLITICO (June 27,
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/57874.html (describing South Carolina’s
immigration laws as similar to Arizona’s, but including additional provisions for a state
immigration enforcement unit). Much of that bill was enjoined in December 2011. Robbie
Brown, Parts of Immigration Law Blocked in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2011, at
A18.
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renting to and employing unauthorized workers, but also would have
nullified any contracts when one party was an undocumented immigrant,
required the police to check the papers of anyone lawfully detained upon
reasonable suspicion that the individual was present without authorization,
mandated that public school officials determine and report on students’
immigration status, and criminalized the act of knowingly “concealing,
harboring or shielding” an unauthorized migrant.54 This final provision was
so broad that it prompted a group of religious leaders to file a constitutional
challenge arguing that the Alabama law infringed on their religious
mission.55 Sub-federal regulation of immigration is not a new phenomenon,
but in their anti-immigrant aim, their scale, and their scope, these state-level
ordinances are unprecedented in modern U.S. history.56
The growing efforts on the part of states and localities to participate in
immigration regulation are pushing courts to reexamine assumptions about
federal exclusivity in this sphere. In the decades since the Court decided
Plyler v. Doe, the scholarly consensus concerning federal preemption in
immigration regulation has eroded somewhat.57 A diverse group of legal
54

H.B. 56 §§ 10–13, 16–18, 27, 28 & 30; 2011 ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-10 to -13, 31-13-16
to -18, 31-13-26 to -27, 31-13-28 to -29 & 31-13-30; see also A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L
COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE WRONG APPROACH: STATE ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IN
2011, at 15 (2012), available at http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/The_
Wrong_Approach_Anti-ImmigrationLeg.pdf (“While Georgia and South Carolina passed
bills more draconian than SB 1070, both are surpassed in harshness by Alabama HB 56,
signed by Republican Governor Robert Bentley on June 9.”). Although the provision
requiring investigation of immigration status (H.B. 56 § 12, ALA. CODE § 31-13-12) has been
allowed into effect pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Arizona, most
of the other provisions of the law have been enjoined at this time. See supra note 52.
55
Justice Dept. Challenges Alabama Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at
A16 (“On Monday, Roman Catholic, United Methodist and Episcopal bishops filed a
lawsuit, saying the law ‘makes it a crime to follow God’s command to be Good
Samaritans.’”). The federal government and a coalition of civil and immigrants’ rights
organizations also challenged the law. Id.
56
Nativist sentiments and anti-immigrant policies in times of economic hardship are
certainly not new. In the era of the Great Depression, for example, tens of thousands of
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans were sent to Mexico, even though many of those
“repatriated” were in fact U.S. citizens who had never been in Mexico. See generally
FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN
REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S (1995) (analyzing the history of the “repatriation” campaign); F.
ARTURO ROSALES, CHICANO! THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 26–86 (2d rev. ed. 1997) (same). The Chinese Exclusion Act also grew out of
economic anxiety. See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRATION
AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 7 (1995). But regulations and discourse
around sub-federal immigration regulation have changed substantially in recent years,
facilitating this wave of sub-federal immigration regulation. See discussion infra at Part III.
57
Of course, a significant number of scholars continue to argue quite persuasively
against a larger role for states and localities in immigration regulation, both on constitutional
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scholars has taken the view that the Constitution does not require federal
exclusivity and that there is legal space for sub-federal entities to participate
in immigration regulation.58
The Supreme Court gave tentative voice to similar views in its recent
decision in U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.59 That case involved a
challenge to the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which provides that the
licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally hire
unauthorized workers may be (and, in some cases, must be) revoked; the
statute also requires that all Arizona employers use the federal electronic
employment authorization database known as E-Verify.60 The Court found
that the regulation was not preempted by federal laws restricting the
employment of unauthorized workers because it was a licensing scheme,
which fell “squarely within the savings clause” of the federal law that
expressly preempted “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”61 Perhaps most tellingly for the course of
future litigation, the Court rejected the argument that the law was impliedly
preempted because it upset the careful balance between employment
restrictions and antidiscrimination protections struck by the Immigration

and on policy grounds. See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 11, at 34 (arguing that “state, county,
and local ordinances aimed at regulating general immigration functions are unconstitutional
as a function of exclusive federal preemptory powers”); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws of
the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2004) (arguing that “the
immigration power is an exclusively federal power that must be exercised uniformly”);
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry: Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497 (2001) (reasoning that the
“immigration power is an exclusively federal one that Congress may not devolve by statute
to the states”).
58
See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 11, at 792 (arguing that “the constitutional mandate
for federal exclusivity over pure immigration law is far more contestable than the traditional
debate would suggest”). While Huntington stresses the constitutionality of sub-federal
immigration regulation, Cristina Rodriguez also argues that there is a functional need for
such regulation. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 571–72 (2008) (“[T]he federal
exclusivity principle obscures our structural need for federal, state, and local participation in
immigration regulation. Today’s realities suggest different structural imperatives—namely
the need for subfederal regulation.” (footnote omitted)); see also Spiro, supra note 11, at
1636 (“Affording the states discretion to act on their preferences diminishes the pressure on
the structure as a whole; otherwise, because you don’t let off the steam, sooner or later the
roof comes off.”).
59
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). As previously noted, my discussion of the Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting case draws in part from my discussion of the case in Chacón, supra
note 27.
60
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -214 (Supp. 2011).
61
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)).
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Reform and Control Act of 198662—an argument that had actually carried
the day in the Third Circuit in litigation involving the Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, employment ordinance.63 Chief Justice Roberts chided that
“[i]mplied preemption analysis does not justify a free-wheeling judicial
inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives.”64
Although much of the reasoning of Whiting explores the effects of the
savings clause of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act on state
licensing provisions,65 the opinion’s language concerning implied
preemption suggests that unless Congress has expressly barred states from
enacting particular immigration-control provisions, the Court will be
somewhat reluctant to invalidate those efforts on preemption grounds.66
This seems very different from the preemption language used by the Court
in Hines v. Davidowitz in striking down a state alien registration scheme
that ran parallel to the federal scheme.67 The Court’s reasoning in Whiting,
which prompted its later remand of the Third Circuit’s decision in Hazleton
v. Lozano,68 has left the door open for state and local regulation of the
employment of unauthorized workers so long as such laws rely on federal
classification concerning who is authorized to work.69 More significantly,
the Court’s suggestion that it will employ a narrow form of implied
preemption analysis emboldened state legislatures around the country that
seek to regulate migration with tools far beyond business licensing
limitations.
More recently, the Court seemed to back away from its seemingly
deep skepticism of field and obstacle preemption analysis in the context of
immigration. In Arizona v. United States, a majority of Justices employed a
traditional field preemption analysis—with citation to Hines v.
Davidowitz—to strike down the alien registration offense in Section 3 of
S.B. 1070.70 The Court struck down the law’s criminal prohibition on
62
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.); see Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981–85.
63
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. City
of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
64
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65
See id. at 1977–81.
66
See id. at 1981–85.
67
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 66–67.
68
Lozano, 131 S. Ct. at 2958 (remanding the case for further consideration in light of
Whiting).
69
For a critique of the Court’s new approach to the preemption question, see Lauren
Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2012).
70
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–03 (2012). I have written a more
detailed analysis of the case and its reasoning in Chacón, supra note 27.
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working without authorization on the grounds that it was obstacle
preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 71
And it also used obstacle preemption analysis to strike down Section 6,
which would have allowed local officials to arrest individuals on the ground
that they had committed removable offenses.72 But it did uphold Section 2,
requiring investigation of immigration status for some individuals lawfully
stopped and all individuals arrested, rejecting the federal government’s
argument that this provision, too, was preempted under a theory of obstacle
preemption.73 A more traditional and robust application of obstacle
preemption principles in the immigration context would have required a
different result.74
C. SUB-FEDERAL CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION

As previously noted, after the Court issued its decision in Whiting,
several states enacted broad criminal provisions in an effort to do indirectly
what they cannot do directly: regulate immigration law. Efforts to
criminalize undocumented labor and the failure to carry alien registration
papers are now barred in the wake of United States v. Arizona;75 efforts to
criminalize alien smuggling are also under scrutiny in the courts.76 But
efforts to empower local enforcement of federal immigration laws have
gained traction.77 A number of other states have also criminalized
“trafficking” in recent years.78 Although legislation to prevent human

71

Id. at 2503–05.
Id. at 2505–07.
73
Id. at 2507–11.
74
For a more detailed critique of the Court’s reasoning and holding in this portion of the
opinion, see Chacón, supra note 27, at Part III.
75
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–07.
76
H.B. 56 § 13; Ala. Code § 31-13-13. The District Court enjoined Alabama’s antismuggling provision in an order dated September 28, 2011, United States v. Alabama, 813 F.
Supp. 2d 1282, 1351 (N.D. Ala. 2011), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, 691 F.3d
1269 (2012). The Arizona district court originally declined to enjoin Arizona’s antismuggling provision, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999–1000 (D. Ariz.
2010), but recently revisited that decision and enjoined the provision, citing the reasoning of
the Eleventh Circuit. Valle Del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz., Sept.
5, 2012) (enjoining the anti-smuggling provisions of S.B. 1070). Arizona has used its antismuggling law for years to prosecute migrants for smuggling themselves. See Ingrid V.
Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1749 (2011) (discussing prosecutions of unauthorized migrants under Arizona’s 2005
criminal prohibition on alien smuggling).
77
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2510–11 (reversing the injunction of Arizona
S.B. 1070’s section 2(B)).
78
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in
the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1647 n.164 (2010).
72
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trafficking is laudable, some of these laws have been codified in ways that
allow state officials to enforce immigration laws indirectly.79 Indeed, some
legislators have been quite candid in stating that this was one of the driving
forces behind the adoption of these laws, yet these provisions have not been
challenged on preemption grounds.80
Clearly, states have not limited their efforts to regulate immigration to
areas in the interstices of federal regulation of the employment of
noncitizens. Instead, they have deployed a host of criminal laws and
ordinances to achieve indirectly that which they cannot achieve directly: the
regulation of immigration law in their states. Juliet Stumpf has explained
that this is not surprising given that the police power is a place where a
state’s authority is at its height.81 State efforts that criminalize activities in
order to affect migration indirectly have, in many cases, avoided court
scrutiny, and the Supreme Court’s Arizona decision evinces tolerance for
sub-federal participation in enforcement efforts. States interested in
controlling migration policy are increasingly using the criminal law as a
tool to address the issue of migration, despite the fact that these laws are
unlikely to have any positive public safety or security effects.
Public safety concerns are not motivating these bills, despite
sometimes-heated rhetoric to the contrary.82 Not only is the evidence fairly
consistent that immigrants commit crimes at relatively low rates compared
to the native born and that the presence of immigrants is negatively
correlated with crime rates,83 but in jurisdictions where restrictive
ordinances were enacted, crime rates were actually falling even as the
unauthorized migrant population was growing.84 Most troublingly, in at
least one jurisdiction, zealous enforcement of immigration laws has come at

79

See id.
Id. at 1649 & n.166 (discussing the restrictionist motivations behind antitrafficking
legislation and enforcement in Georgia, Missouri, and Arizona).
81
Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1593 (2008).
82
One famous example of efforts to play on fears of migrant criminality is Arizona
Governor Jan Brewer’s now-infamous allegation that S.B. 1070 was necessary to combat
dangerous beheadings in the Arizona desert. Robert Farley, Beheadings, Kidnappings and
Other Immigration Distortions, TAMPA BAY TIMES POLITIFACT.COM (Sept. 10, 2010, 3:01
PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2010/sep/10/fact-checking-beheadingsand-other-immigration/. Arizona’s brief to the Supreme Court in favor of S.B. 1070 opens
on the first page with an assertion that a public safety “emergency” motivated the passage of
the bill. Brief for Petitioners at 1, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11182), 2012 WL 416748, at *1.
83
See supra note 16.
84
See Farley, supra note 82 (“FBI crime statistics show that violent crime fell 11 percent
from 2004 to 2008 in Arizona.”).
80
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the expense of investigations of serious and violent crimes.85 And many
law enforcement officials have expressed concern that their new
responsibilities to police migration will destroy the trust necessary to
achieve effective community policing in their jurisdictions.86
The apparent basis for using criminal law as a response to migration
issues is the myth of migrant criminality, sometimes tinged with (or even
steeped in) racism or nativism. Criminal law is merely a vehicle by which
legislators attempt to address the litany of problems that unauthorized
migrants are purported to have caused—from alleged beheadings to school
overcrowding to changing local culture—not only because that is the tool
that seems more likely to avoid legal scrutiny, but also because it is the tool
that most closely resonates with the public discourse around migration,
which is dominated by the trope of criminality.87 Unfortunately, this creates
a self-perpetuating phenomenon where migrants are increasingly subject to
criminal law sanctions, thereby ironically validating previously unjustified
assumptions concerning migrant criminality.88
The Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States has helped to clarify
the extent to which the Court is willing to allow states to police migration
within their own borders. But even before the decision was handed down in
June 2012, many states were already taking the position that they have a
fair amount of latitude to regulate immigration indirectly. This trend,
particularly in conjunction with the Court’s decision to affirm the
constitutionality of investigations into immigration status by state and local
law enforcement, provides legislators with ample tools to achieve
immigration enforcement by attrition.
These laws have other costs as well. Recently, the Department of
Justice has compiled reports concerning state and local policing practices
85
See Marc Lacey, Sex Crimes Were Ignored, Say Reports on Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2011, at A14 [hereinafter Sex Crimes Were Ignored] (“Sheriff Arpaio . . . is perhaps best
known for his . . . aggressive raids aimed at illegal immigrants. But . . . [h]is deputies failed
to investigate or conducted only the sketchiest of inquiries into hundreds of sex crimes
between 2005 and 2007 . . . . Many of those cases involved molested children.”).
86
See, e.g., J.J. Hensley, Immigration-enforcement efforts damaging to community,
police group says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (March 19, 2011 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2011/03/19/20110319immigrationpolice-enforcement-weak.html (describing a report of the Police Executive Review Forum
finding that local immigration enforcement damaged police–community trust).
87
See Chacón, Unsecured Borders, supra note 1, at 1835–50; Ian F. Haney Lopez, PostRacial Racism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2010).
88
As previously noted, see supra note 16, earlier studies have discredited the link
between migrants and crime. Some have done so by looking at incarceration rates. As
incarceration rates of migrants soar as a result of the increased prosecution of migration
crimes, it will become important for scholars to disaggregate the kinds of crimes for which
migrants are incarcerated.
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that have resulted in widespread racial profiling of Latinos.89 The
discriminatory policing practices identified in these reports are often related
to sub-federal efforts to police immigration.90 As states and localities
continue to attempt to regulate immigration and to assist in federal
immigration enforcement,91 it seems all but certain that these problems will
continue to grow.
II. INCREASED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT
The second maxim of immigration enforcement that has given way to
a new reality is that the federal government does not do much to enforce the
nation’s immigration laws. The notion that the federal government is “not
doing anything” or “not doing enough” to enforce federal immigration law
has actually become something of a mantra among restrictionists,
particularly those who have pushed for sub-federal immigration regulation
and enforcement.92 As a historical matter, it is clear that the federal
89

See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y, Maricopa Cnty. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from
Thomas E. Perez], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf (“Based upon our extensive investigation, we find reasonable
cause to believe that MCSO engages in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.”);
Mark Zaretsky, Justice Department Finds East Haven Police Department Deliberately
Targeted Latinos, NEW HAVEN REG. (Dec. 19, 2011), http://nhregister.com/articles/
2011/12/19/news/metro/doc4eef61a24fca4049275981.txt (“The East Haven Police
Department ‘engages in a pattern or practice of systematically discriminating against Latinos
in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution,’ U.S. Department of Justice officials
said Monday.”).
90
Marc Lacey, U.S. Says Arizona Sheriff Shows Pervasive Bias Against Latinos, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Sheriff Bias] (“The report also suggested that
Sheriff Arpaio’s well-publicized raids aimed at arresting illegal immigrants were sometimes
prompted by complaints that described no criminal activity but referred to people with ‘dark
skin’ or to Spanish speakers congregating in an area. ‘The use of these types of bias-infected
indicators as a basis for conducting enforcement activity contributes to the high number of
stops and detentions lacking in legal justification,’ the report said.”).
91
See discussion infra Part III.
92
See, e.g., Dan Rivoli, Alabama Immigration Law Challenged Again: U.S. Government
Seeks Injunction, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/227787/
20111009/alabama-immigration-law-appeal.htm (“Alabama, along with other states
including Georgia and Arizona, has implemented a law this year to make life for illegal
immigrants difficult. Supporters of these laws say they are addressing an illegal immigrant
problem in their state created by the federal government’s inaction.”); Press Release,
Statement by Governor Jan Brewer, Apr. 23, 2010, available at http://azgovernor.gov/
dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf (“[D]ecades of federal
inaction and misguided policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation.”).
Pratheepan Gulasekaram and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan have noted that states and
localities claiming to act because the federal government has failed to do so is the
“conventional” explanation for sub-federal immigration regulation.
Pratheepan
Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Polarized Change: An Evidence-Based Theory
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immigration agencies have not succeeded in implementing widespread
measures to effectuate immigration enforcement.93 But over the past
decade, the federal immigration enforcement apparatus has ballooned in
size, and the effects of this expansion are widespread. This Part first
evaluates the rapid growth in various forms of federal enforcement efforts,
then focuses particular attention on the rise of federal prosecutions of
immigration crimes.
A. THE MANY FACES OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

In fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars on
immigration enforcement activities.94
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), the agency responsible for immigration enforcement
activities in the interior of the country, had a budget of just over $5
billion.95 Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which includes the Border
of Subnational Immigration Regulation 7–10 (Jan. 28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the author). It is a narrative that they ultimately discount with empirical data. Id. at
21–24.
93
For this one need only look at the rise in the number of unauthorized migrants in the
country since 1986. In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
which authorized the legalization of millions of unauthorized migrants present in the country
at that time. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)). Just under 3
million people received lawful status as a result of the IRCA. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ,
supra note 9, at 1179. To gain the support of more restrictionist members of Congress,
IRCA also included an employer sanctions provision and enforcement mechanisms. 8
U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). The notion was that by drying up future employment opportunities
for unauthorized workers, the law would stop the flow of future unauthorized workers after
the legalization. This did not come to pass, perhaps because the law was not vigorously
enforced in the twenty years that followed. See generally Michael A. Wishnie, Prohibiting
the Employment of Unauthorized Workers: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
193, 209–210 [hereinafter The Experiment Fails] (discussing the lax and opportunistic
enforcement of IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions).
Currently, there are about 11.2 million noncitizens present in the country without legal
authorization. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf. This number has declined slightly in
recent years, largely as a result of the faltering U.S. economy. COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: A PATH TO
BETTER PERFORMANCE 32–34 (Steve Redburn et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter BUDGETING FOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT] (finding that immigration enforcement efforts had very little
measurable impact on migration flows and that the downturn in the U.S. economy appears to
account for most of the decrease in flow in recent years).
94
I discussed the expansion of federal enforcement expenditures previously, in Jennifer
M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1571–72 (2010). I borrow directly from
that discussion in this paragraph.
95
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 19 (2008),
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Patrol, as well as other enforcement agencies focusing on the flow of goods
and people across the U.S. borders, had a budget of just over $10 billion,96
bringing the combined total operating budgets for the two to over $15
billion in fiscal year 2008. By way of comparison, in 1998, the budget for
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was just over $3.6
billion.97 This figure includes immigration services that are now provided
by Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and are not included in the
$15 billion figure above. Additionally, although these budget figures
reflect DHS spending on investigations, prosecutions, detention, and
removal, they do not reflect all of the federal costs of immigration
enforcement, given the costs of prosecuting and punishing immigration
crimes in criminal courts. Even so, the $15 billion budget for ICE and CBP
represents a five-fold budget increase in the past decade, and the budget is
more than fifteen times what it was in 1988.98
Another significant transformation in immigration enforcement is in
the rise of immigration detention.99 Largely as a result of mandatory
detention provisions enacted by Congress in 1996,100 the vast majority of
those arrested for immigration offenses are detained as they await trial or
removal proceedings. Strikingly, although 81% of those charged with drugtrafficking offenses are detained after arrest and 87% of those charged with
violent crimes are detained after arrest, a full 95% of those who have
committed immigration crimes (which are largely nonviolent and most
often misdemeanors) are detained upon arrest.101 Given the significant rise
in the number of immigration arrests over the past decade, this practice of
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf.
96
Id.
97
An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs on the Southwest Border:
Immigration and Naturalization Service, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/enforce/border/ins_3.html (last visited Dec. 9,
2012).
98
JUSTICE MGMT. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT’S 2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 104–08 (2002) [hereinafter
BUDGET TREND DATA], available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/
pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf (showing budget trends for INS from 1975 to 2003 and recording an
INS budget of $1.01 billion in 1988).
99
The next two paragraphs draw from my discussion of these issues in A Diversion of
Attention?, supra note 94, at 1577–78.
100
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c)); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (upholding the
mandatory detention provisions); Margaret Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to
Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 348–54 (David A. Martin & Peter H.
Schuck eds., 2005) (describing the enactment of these provisions and critiquing their
overbreadth).
101
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, supra note 5, at 1.
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detaining most arrestees has generated an explosion in immigration
detention that has been costly for taxpayers and lucrative for private
contractors.102
Regarding the immigration detention landscape, Anil Kalhan recently
observed, “[i]n 1994, officials held approximately 6,000 noncitizens in
detention on any given day. That daily average had surpassed 20,000
individuals by 2001 and 33,000 by 2008. Over the same period, the overall
number of individuals detained each year has swelled from approximately
81,000 to approximately 380,000.”103 Although civil immigration detention
technically is not a part of the criminal justice system, as a practical matter,
many noncitizens in immigration detention in fact are housed in county
jails, and even those detained in separate facilities are subject to the same
kinds of punitive detention as criminal defendants. Indeed, a 2009 report
by Dora Schriro, then a senior Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
official, found that immigration detainees are held under circumstances that
are unjustifiably punitive given the noncriminal purposes of immigration
detention.104 Thus, it is important to take the civil detention of nearly
400,000 noncitizens into account when contemplating the extent to which
immigration has been criminalized in recent years.
Another measure of the growth in federal enforcement efforts can be
found in the physical space along the U.S.–Mexico border, which has
become increasingly militarized during this period. CBP now operates six
Predator drones along the border.105 For a time, and in a move that further
obfuscates the total dollars being spent on immigration enforcement, 1,200
102

See Christopher Nugent, Towards Balancing a New Immigration and Nationality Act:
Enhanced Immigration Enforcement and Fair, Humane and Cost-Effective Treatment of
Aliens, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 243, 254–55 & n.46 (2005)
(discussing state, local, and private fiscal benefits of immigration detention); Nina Bernstein,
City of Immigrants Fills Jail Cells with Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A1 (reporting
on illusory nature of fiscal benefits for localities but ample benefits for private contractors);
Nina Bernstein, Getting Tough on Immigrants to Turn a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011,
at A1 (discussing financial benefits accruing to private immigration detention contractors
globally). Since federal arrests constitute only 1% of total arrests made, see MARK
MOLTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2009 (2011), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf, it comes as no
surprise that private companies in the detention industry have actively promoted state-level
immigration legislation. See Laura Sullivan & Beau Hodai, How Corporate Interests Got SB
1070 Passed (NPR broadcast Nov. 9, 2010), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/
2010/11/09/131191523/how-corporate-interests-got-sb-1070-passed.
103
Kalhan, supra note 13, at 44–45.
104
DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10, 15 (2009).
105
U.S. Adds Surveillance Drone on Mexico Border, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/27/us-usa-mexico-drone-idUSTRE7BQ17220111
227.
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National Guard members were also stationed along the border.106 President
Obama recently reduced that number by 300, but this costly intervention
continues.107 The only major piece of immigration legislation that Congress
was able to agree on in the past decade was a bill to build 700 miles of
fencing along the southern border with Mexico, notwithstanding the
evidence that the costs of the project—in terms of dollars, the environment,
private property rights, and human lives—would outweigh any measureable
benefits in the reduction of unauthorized migration.108
Increased federal enforcement efforts have resulted in a huge increase
in the number of noncitizens removed from the country each year. As a
result of these efforts, the number of individuals removed from the United
States annually has increased significantly—from about 18,000 in 1980 to
about 30,000 in 1990 to about 188,000 in 2000, and reaching a record high
of about 392,000 in 2011 (the most recent year for which official statistics
are available).109 Of course, if individuals were simply removed, it might
be easy to exempt these individuals from a discussion of
overcriminalization. But noncitizens caught up in expanded removal efforts
are not simply pushed through an administrative system and removed. A
significant and growing number of them are subjected to federal criminal
prosecution.110 The following Subpart discusses and critiques the
106

National Guard Forces to Be Cut at Southern Border, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at

A29.
107

See id.
See, e.g., CHAD C. HADDAL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33659, BORDER
SECURITY: BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER 26–27 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf (estimating the cost of the border fence at
more than $16.4 million to $70 million per mile over the projected twenty-five-year life of
the fence and questioning whether the barrier would even be effective at reducing
unauthorized migration).
109
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 (2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics. Notably, the number of people
“returned” (which would include not only noncitizens who were removed, but also those
noncitizens—often stopped near the border or its functional equivalent—who leave the
United States without formal process or otherwise departed “voluntarily” in the absence of a
removal order) has actually fallen in recent years. From a record high of 1.676 million in
2000, that number was 323,542 in 2011, id., suggesting a preference on the part of the past
two administrations to remove noncitizens through the issuance of a formal removal order
that will serve as a permanent disability in a noncitizen’s future efforts to reenter.
110
Many individuals removed by the federal government also entered the process
through the states’ criminal justice systems, and their immigration status played a significant
role in the processing and disposition of their criminal cases. See generally Ingrid V. Eagly,
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variations in Local Enforcement, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the variable ways in which immigration
status affects the criminal process experienced by noncitizens in three different
jurisdictions). The interplay between sub-federal criminal justice systems and the
immigration system is considered further infra Part III.
108
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tremendous increase in federal immigration prosecutions.
B. PROSECUTING FEDERAL IMMIGRATION CRIMES

The growth of federal immigration enforcement efforts is manifested
clearly in the rise in prosecutions of immigration crimes. 111 In 1993, the
number of suspects in matters received by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for
immigration offenses was 5,934,112 of whom 5,400 were prosecuted or
disposed of by a magistrate.113 This was only 5.4% of the total number of
cases investigated in that year.114 In these records, immigration offenses are
listed as a subcategory of “[o]ther” “[p]ublic-order” offenses.
The effects of the draconian 1996 changes in the immigration laws 115
were felt in the years that followed. By 2000, the number of individuals
investigated for immigration offenses was 16,495.116 This was only 13.4%
of the total number of cases investigated in that year.117 Interestingly, this
was so even though the INS made 33% of the arrests made by federal
officers in that year,118 suggesting that in many cases individuals who were
arrested by the INS were either not investigated or, presumably in a few
cases, were prosecuted for other, more serious offenses. In these records,
immigration offenses continue to be listed as a subcategory of “[o]ther”
“[p]ublic-order” offenses.119
But the true explosion in criminal immigration enforcement came in
the years following the September 11th attacks. Once the INS had been
reorganized into three separate agencies under the auspices of the DHS and
the money for immigration enforcement began pouring in, arrests and
prosecutions for immigration crimes skyrocketed. This trend has continued
year after year, no matter who is in the White House and who controls
111
I discussed this trend in some detail in Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration
Through
Crime,
109
COLUM.
L.
REV.
SIDEBAR
135,
139
(2009),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/109/135_Chacon.pdf. I borrow
from that discussion in this Subpart.
112
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1993, at 15 (1996), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cfjs93.pdf.
113
Id. at 15–16.
114
Id.
115
See supra notes 13 & 100 and accompanying text.
116
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2000, at 1 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=605.
117
Id. at 1 (indicating that U.S. Attorneys initiated investigations in 123,559 cases in
2000, and that 16,495 of those involved immigration offenses).
118
Id. at 1.
119
Id. at 27.
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Congress.
With regard to arrests, the Bureau of Justice Statistics recently
recorded that “[b]etween 2005 and 2009, immigration arrests increased at
an annual average rate of 23%,” and that “[i]mmigration offenses (46%)
were the most common of all arrest offenses in 2009, followed by drug
(17%) and supervision (13%) violations.”120 The government is now
arresting more than twice as many people annually as it did in 1995, and the
bulk of that increase is the result of increased immigration arrests
originating with DHS officials.121
At present, the number of immigration convictions occurring each
month outstrips the annual total of immigration prosecutions in 1993.122
This is not a deviation, but has been the norm for several years.123 Between
mid-2008 and September 2011, conviction rates were almost always in
excess of 6,000 per month, and approached numbers as high as almost
10,000 per month.124
Immigration prosecutions take many forms. Until recently, by far the
most numerous were for simple misdemeanor illegal entry.125 Obtaining a
conviction for this crime simply requires the prosecutor to establish that an
individual entered the country without inspection or evaded inspection.126
A typical case might involve a person who crossed the border away from a
formal port of entry. No particular mens rea is required for a conviction of
entry without inspection,127 although the law also contains a provision for
the prosecution of those who “willfully” conceal a material fact or make
false statements to gain entry.128
120

FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, supra note 5, at 1.
See id. at 1, fig.1.
122
Compare Immigration Convictions for September 2011, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Dec.
14,
2011),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlysep11/gui/
[hereinafter Immigration Convictions for September 2011] (placing the number of
immigration prosecutions in September 2011 at 6,055, and noting that this number is
actually a decrease from the previous month), with supra text accompanying note 113.
123
See Immigration Convictions for September 2011, supra note 122, at fig.1. As this
Article goes to press, more recent data suggests that immigration prosecutions peaked early
in 2011 and have declined since that time, although the numbers are still at historic highs.
Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecutions, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 12,
2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283/.
124
Immigration Convictions for September 2011, supra note 122, at fig.1.
125
8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006); see Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (noting that 2011
was “the first year that recorded prosecutions for illegal reentry surpassed those of illegal
entry, which have been declining from their high during FY 2009”).
126
See § 1325(a).
127
Id.
128
Id.
121
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In 2009, two-thirds of the individuals prosecuted for immigration
crimes were “disposed by U.S. magistrates as petty misdemeanants in . . .
five Southwest border districts.”129 The rote prosecution of illegal entrants
created a huge distortion in some dockets.130 The prosecution of illegal
entry along the southern border consumed resources that courts might
otherwise have used to combat violent crime.131 Magistrate judges have
typically handled these cases in proceedings in which mass plea agreements
are obtained.132 These proceedings fall well short of the kind of procedural
protections generally given to a defendant taking a criminal plea.133 Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit has concluded that these en masse plea agreements violate
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.134 Unfortunately, individual
defendants in that case—and many others—are without a remedy because
they are unable to show prejudice.
Until recently, the second most common group of prosecutions was for
felony reentry, but in 2011, felony reentry prosecutions actually exceeded
prosecutions for misdemeanor entry.135 “From 2001 to 2008, 111,920
[noncitizens] were prosecuted for the crime [of illegal re-entry] . . . .
Obama’s administration is averaging about 34,355 annually and is on pace
to surpass 103,000 in his first three years.”136 The surge in felony reentry
prosecutions is no surprise. Since millions of noncitizens have been
formally removed in recent years, if even a small percentage of those
individuals with strong ties to the United States attempt to return during the
period in which their return is barred,137 this will cause a surge in felony
129

FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, supra note 5, at 5.
Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program Success Are Unproven (NPR broadcast
Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=129827870.
131
Id.
132
See Chacón, Managing Migration, supra note 1, at 142–43; see also JOANNA
LYDGATE, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, BERKELEY
LAW SCHOOL, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 1–2 (2010),
available at www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf.
133
Chacón, Managing Migration, supra note 1, at 145–47.
134
United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The problem
generated by the massive caseload on the court understandably led the court to adopt a
shortcut. Abstractly considered, the shortcut is not only understandable but reasonable. The
shortcut, however, does not comply with Rule 11. We cannot permit this rule to be
disregarded in the name of efficiency nor be violated because it is too demanding for the
district court to observe.”).
135
Julian Aguilar, Illegal Re-entry Cases Surge Under Obama, TEX. TRIB. (June 15,
2011), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-mexico-border-news/texas-mexico-border/illegalreentry-cases-surge-under-obama/.
136
Id.; see also Immigration Convictions for September 2011, supra note 122.
137
An individual who is removed from the U.S. is generally barred from reentering for
five years, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006), although that bar stretches to ten years for
130
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reentry. And at least some portion of the tens of thousands of border
crossers who were prosecuted for illegal entry are attempting to reenter—
except that now, their entry is a felony by virtue of their prior conviction.
One thing that the number of felony reentry prosecutions makes clear is that
many noncitizens are not deterred from returning by their past detentions or
by the threat of future detention or criminal incarceration.138
As with the misdemeanor entry cases, felony reentry cases are often
resolved through plea agreements. Unless the initial removal was invalid,
there are few grounds upon which a defendant can successfully contest this
charge, which carries a potential sentence of up to twenty years. 139 Very
few defendants receive twenty-year sentences, but what is striking about
these prosecutions is how varied the sentences are. For defendants in “FastTrack” jurisdictions, pleas of two to three years are not uncommon, while
those who by happenstance are detained and tried in other areas (where
perhaps the pressure of immigration cases on the docket is less of a
problem), the sentences tend to be substantially longer, regardless of the
underlying offenses—if any—that led to the initial removal.140 The
irrationality of federal sentencing for reentry crimes suggests a much deeper
lack of consensus over the seriousness of the offense and the degree to
which such sentences serve as a general deterrent to illegal entry and
reentry. As with drug crimes, heavy sentences do not seem to be tethered to
any kind of factual analysis aimed at determining the optimal use of
criminal sanctions to achieve enforcement goals.
The remainder of prosecutions for immigration offenses constitutes an
extremely small portion of the overall prosecutions. Charges for alien
smuggling, human trafficking, and immigration-related fraud are few and
far between.141 Criminal prosecutions of employers who have violated
anyone who has been present without authorization for a year or more,
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
138
See also BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 93, at 34, 118
(concluding that increased reliance on criminal prosecutions had little deterrent effect on
unauthorized migrants).
139
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
140
Alison Siegler, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G
REP. 299, 299 (2009).
141
Data from January 2012 is illustrative. The top-ranked immigration charge in federal
district court in that month was illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006), numbering 1,477,
while the next highest number of prosecutions for alien smuggling and harboring, § 1324,
numbered only 166, and all additional charges were in the double or single digits. See
Immigration Prosecutions for January 2012, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjan12/fil/. That same month, in
the magistrate courts, the most frequently cited lead charge was misdemeanor illegal entry,
§ 1325, which was the lead charge for 56.8% of the 6,069 defendants in immigration cases
filed before magistrates that month, with felony reentry, § 1326, comprising 37.9%—almost
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IRCA’s criminal provisions are rare.142 The bulk of prosecutorial resources
are aimed not at those who prey on or profit from the migrants, but on the
migrants themselves.
In short, the past fifteen years have witnessed a massive expansion of
federal resources dedicated to immigration enforcement, an unprecedented
militarization of the southern border, an exponential increase in the number
of noncitizens held in detention, and a more than twelve-fold increase in the
number of criminal immigration prosecutions. Yet, as previously noted, the
mantra that the federal government is not enforcing immigration law is still
frequently invoked in the national dialogue concerning immigration. Given
the tremendous cost of this endeavor—and given that many of these
expenses have come at a time when so many other federal programs are
being asked to cut back or slow growth—it is not clear exactly what would
appease those who call for ever more vigorous enforcement of immigration
laws.
Reviewing the figures concerning federal enforcement efforts and
federal prosecutions of immigration crimes reveals a very different problem
from the one that has been the rallying cry of restrictionists. The federal
government is enforcing immigration law. It is enforcing immigration law
as never before and is relying on the criminal justice system in an
unprecedented way to do so. The question is: do these enforcement efforts
make sense? Or do they constitute an overcriminalization of migration, the
costs of which are difficult to justify when weighed against any cost savings
(if indeed there are costs savings) achieved by reducing the number of
unauthorized workers present within our borders? The data suggests that
this use of the criminal justice system is having, at best, a marginal effect
on migration flows, and may be having no impact at all.143
Unfortunately, this is not the question that the immigration debate is
focused upon, but it is an important question. For even as the federal
all of the remaining immigration cases. Id.
142
ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40002, IMMIGRATION-RELATED
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 8 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf (noting that there were only 196 criminal
arrests of managerial employees in connection with workplace hiring violations, and noting
that “ICE . . . criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations represent a very small
percentage of the potential population of violators”); see also Wishnie, The Experiment
Fails, supra note 93 at 209–11. For arguments that employer sanctions are harmful to
workers and should be abolished, see Bill Ong Hing, Asian Americans and Immigration
Reform, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 83, 104 (2010) (“The rationale for employer sanctions always has
been that the law would dry up jobs for the undocumented and discourage them from
coming. However, a close look at ICE raids reveals that employer sanctions have had
disastrous effects on all workers.”); Wishnie, The Experiment Fails, supra note 93, at 214–
17.
143
BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 93, at 34.
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government ramps up its enforcement effort, it is being joined by a number
of force multipliers in the form of state and local law enforcement agencies
that are now expending some of their own resources to enforce federal
immigration laws.
III. DECLINING FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAWS
Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government assumed an
almost exclusive role not merely in the legal regulation of migration, as
previously noted, but also in the enforcement of immigration law.144 This is
not to suggest that states and localities have played no role in immigration
enforcement. On the contrary, during the twentieth century, state and local
governments participated in a number of high-profile attempts to rid their
borders of individuals who were (or were perceived to be) undocumented.
For example, local officials actively participated in the “repatriation” of
Mexicans—and many Mexican-Americans—during the 1930s.145 And in
144

Chin & Miller, supra note 46, at 273–74 (reviewing existing precedent as standing for
the proposition that “[t]he federal government has exclusive authority not only to establish
the standards for the admission and exclusion of immigrants, but also to apply and enforce
them” (emphasis added)); Wishnie, supra note 11, at 1089 (“[A]lthough individual police
officials have occasionally directed their departments to enforce immigration laws, on the
whole, enforcement of the immigration statutes has traditionally been the province of federal
immigration officials.” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, reviewing history and precedent,
Wishnie and others have concluded that sub-federal enforcement of civil immigration law by
local officials is unconstitutional. See id. at 1089 (“Nor may this constitutional power to
regulate immigration be devolved by statute or executive decree to state or local authorities,
because the federal immigration power is ‘incapable of transfer’ and ‘cannot be granted
away.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 1090 n.35 (citing scholarly work); see also Huyen Pham,
The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of
Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 995–96 (2004)
(arguing that local enforcement of immigration law is inherently unconstitutional).
145
See FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL:
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, at 119–59 (rev. ed. 2006). During the 1930s,
hundreds of thousands of Mexicans (and U.S. citizens of Mexican descent) were
“repatriated” to Mexico. Balderrama and Rodriguez estimate the number to be about 1
million, with 400,000 leaving from California alone. Id. at 151, 305. The term
“repatriation” is misleading for two reasons. First, it suggests a voluntary movement, when
in fact, much of the relocation was generated by legal coercion by federal, state, and local
actors, in connection with threats of violence and virulent discrimination by private actors.
Id. at 119–59, 305. Second, it suggests that those being “repatriated” were returning to their
native land—a situation that was not the case for the many U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry
who were sent to Mexico during this time. Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation”
of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the “War on Terror,” 26 PACE L. REV. 1,
4–5 (2005) (estimating that 60% of the “repatriated” Mexicans were U.S. citizens); see also
BALDERRAMA & RODRIGUEZ, supra, at 307–08 (giving examples of citizen children caught
up in the “repatriation” movement). State and local governments were active participants in
the campaign, using coercion and physical force to achieve the removal of Mexicans and
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the course of the federally orchestrated immigration policing action known
as “Operation Wetback,” local governments acted in cooperation with the
federal government in detaining undocumented noncitizens—as well as
U.S. citizens of Mexican descent and Mexican migrants lawfully present—
and removing them to Mexico.146
In spite of the frequent interventions on the part of state and local
actors in immigration enforcement, formal legal authority for such
interventions did not exist. One might argue that the power to enforce
federal immigration law is an inherent power of state and local law
enforcement, but throughout the past century, neither the existing case law
nor existing scholarly theories supported this conclusion. Indeed, in
response to confusion on the point, the Department of Justice issued a 1996
memorandum outlining the limits of state and local authority to enforce
immigration laws as these limits were understood at the time.147 The
memorandum concluded that “[s]tate and local police lack recognized legal
authority to stop and detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil
deportability, as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or
other laws.”148 On the other hand, the memorandum also concluded that
“state and local police may constitutionally detain or arrest aliens for
violating the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act.”149 In short, the federal position was that a state or local police officer
had the authority to conduct arrests for immigration crimes such as felony
reentry or alien smuggling, but not for the civil offense of being present in
the country without current legal authorization. And even when the state
had the power to arrest an immigration violator, there was no basis to
prosecute that person for immigration violations at the state level.150 This
task—as well as the task of removing that person from the country—
remained the sole province of the federal government.
Mexican-Americans. Id. at 305; Johnson, supra, at 4–5. This was true notwithstanding the
constitutional obstacles to this sub-federal immigration enforcement. Johnson, supra, at 9–
10. (“Through efforts to enforce the immigration laws, state and local governments also
infringed on the federal immigration power.”).
146
JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 183–202 (1980) (discussing the cooperation of many
California and some Arizona officials, and opposition from Texas officials).
147
Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. O.L.C.
26, 32 (1996) [hereinafter Apprehending Illegal Aliens], available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/immstopo1a.htm; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, BACKGROUNDER: IMMIGRATION
LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 1 (2004), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/BackgrounderStateLocalEnforcement.pdf (discussing the Office of Legal Counsel memo).
148
Apprehending Illegal Aliens, supra note 147.
149
Id. at 27.
150
Chin & Miller, supra note 46, at 312–14.
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In two major pieces of legislation enacted in 1996, Congress expanded
the power of state and local law enforcement to enforce federal immigration
law in three specific ways.151 First, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) formally authorized sub-federal law enforcement
officers to arrest and detain unlawfully present noncitizens who had
“previously been convicted of a felony in the United States.”152 Second, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
empowered the Attorney General153 to authorize local officials to enforce
civil immigration laws when “an actual or imminent mass influx of
aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal
response.”154 Finally, IIRIRA added § 287(g) to the Immigration and
Nationality Act to allow the Attorney General to delegate immigration
enforcement authority to state and local police pursuant to a formal
agreement between the state or local agency and the Department of Justice,
provided the state or local officers have undergone adequate training to
enforce the immigration laws.155 Such agreements, now increasingly
common, are often referred to as “287(g) agreements.”156 None of these
provisions would have been necessary if state and local governments
actually had “inherent authority” to enforce immigration laws, which
suggests that Congress did not believe that they did.
In 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) under Attorney General
John Ashcroft revised the 1996 memorandum regarding the role of state and
local police in immigration enforcement, concluding that state and local law
enforcement had “inherent authority” to arrest and detain immigration
violators, including civil immigration violators.157 Although the OLC
memo was not immediately released, this new policy—which contravened
151

NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 147, at 3, 5. I have previously traced the
sub-federalization of immigration enforcement developments in Chacón, supra note 27, at
Part I.A and Chacón, supra note 94, at 1579–98, and I draw from those discussions
throughout the remainder of this Subpart.
152
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(c) (2006)).
153
This responsibility now falls to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (10) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
154
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-646 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)).
155
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
156
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano
Announces New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships &
Adds 11 New Agreements (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Dept. of Homeland Sec. Press
Release], available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247246453625.shtm.
157
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf.
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conventional scholarly opinion and prior legal opinions—created a new
source of confusion concerning the scope of state and local power to
enforce immigration law.
Given leeway, some law enforcement agencies began asserting
“inherent authority” to conduct arrests to effectuate both federal civil and
criminal immigration laws.158 Although this position is difficult to
reconcile with the narrow and specific congressional grants of power to
states and localities in the 1996 legislation, the notion has gained a
surprising degree of currency in recent years.159 As a consequence, state
and local law enforcement are engaged in policing immigration at
unprecedented levels, sometimes without the express authority of the
federal government.160
Compounding this trend is the necessary
involvement of state and local officials in enforcing the sub-federal
immigration laws enacted in their jurisdictions.161 Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and
similar state laws have attempted to expand the states’ ability to participate
in and, indeed, to shape and define the parameters of local immigration
enforcement through the use of their own criminal and licensing laws.162
At the same time that the federal government has sought to rein in
158
See, e.g., Penny Starr, Sheriff Arpaio’s Office is Only Law Enforcement Agency in
U.S. Denied Authority to Enforce Immigration Laws, Says DHS, CNS NEWS (Oct. 22, 2009),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/sheriff-arpaios-office-only-law-enforcement-agency-usdenied-authority-enforce (reporting Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s statement that he would continue to
enforce immigration law even if not authorized to do so by a 287(g) agreement, and citing to
Kris Kobach’s argument, relying on the 2002 OLC memo, see supra note 157, that Arpaio
was entitled to do so). The legality and legitimacy of these enforcement efforts have been
challenged by the Justice Department. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 89, at 3
(“Our investigation uncovered a number of instances in which immigration-related crime
suppression activities were initiated in the community after [the Maricopa County Sherriff’s
Office] received complaints that described no criminal activity, but rather referred, for
instance, to individuals with ‘dark skin’ congregating in one area, or individuals speaking
Spanish at a local business. The use of these types of bias-infected indicators as a basis for
conducting enforcement activity contributes to the high number of stops and detentions
lacking in legal justification.”). The Department has found similar problems with the East
Haven, Connecticut, Police Department—another department that engages in immigration
policing in the absence of a 287(g) agreement. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor of East Haven at 9 (Dec.
19, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_1219-11.pdf (“EHPD does not have . . . a ‘287(g) agreement[].’ Nonetheless, EHPD has
allowed its officers to engage in haphazard and uncoordinated immigration enforcement
efforts to target Latino drivers for traffic stops.”). It is impossible to know just how many
jurisdictions are engaged in such practices, but clearly such practices are ongoing in some
jurisdictions.
159
Chin & Miller, supra note 46, at 255–56.
160
See Starr, supra note 158.
161
See supra Part I.
162
Supra Part I.C.
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states and localities in their immigration enforcement efforts,163 the federal
government has also come to rely on state and local law enforcement agents
in conducting its own, newly expanded enforcement efforts.164 As
previously noted, 1996 legislation empowered the federal government to
enter into contractual arrangements with sub-federal entities to enforce
immigration laws.165 Although the federal government did not begin
entering into such agreements in the 1990s, it did so throughout the last
decade, and currently has contractual agreements with fifty-seven law
enforcement agencies in twenty-one states.166 Depending on the scope of
the agreements, state and local officials in these jurisdictions can do
anything from screen the immigration status of jail inmates167 to conduct
arrests for federal immigration violations.168 Critics contending that the
federal government failed to sufficiently train and oversee state and local
agents in implementing these agreements were vindicated when a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report essentially concluded just
that.169 As a result, agents were engaging in racial profiling and other
impermissible tactics in policing immigration. Since the GAO report was
issued, the Obama administration has increased oversight and training and
reduced the number of 287(g) agreements, although critics contend that the
underlying problems of profiling and other constitutional abuses
continue.170
163

See discussion of the federal lawsuits in Arizona and Alabama at notes 50–54, supra.
For a discussion of the tension in these policies, see Julianne Hing, Justice Dept.
Finally Cuffs Sheriff Joe, But Not the Policy That Made Him, COLORLINES (Jan. 5, 2012,
9:54 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/01/sheriff_joe_will_cooperate_with_doj_
cleanup_issues_demands_of_his_own.html.
165
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 155–57.
166
Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm#signed-moa (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
167
See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement and the Arizona Dep’t of Corr. (Oct. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gazdeptofco
rrections101509.pdf.
168
See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement and Springdale Police Dep’t (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gspringdalepd101509.pdf.
169
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 4–7, 10–19 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09109.pdf.
170
For a brief discussion by the Department of Homeland Security concerning its own
efforts to reform the program, see Dept. of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 156.
For an example of continued criticism from immigrants’ rights organizations in response to
these reforms, see, for example, ICE Reforms Fail to Solve Fundamental 287(g) Problems,
164
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Moreover, the federal government has not simply invited state and
local participation in immigration enforcement. With the rollout of the
Secure Communities program, the federal government has mandated the
participation of state and local officials in federal immigration enforcement.
Pursuant to the Secure Communities program, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) screens the biometric information gathered by state and
local law-enforcement to identify noncitizens in state prisons and local jails
who are potentially subject to removal. As of August 22, 2012, the
biometric-information-sharing capability of the Secure Communities
program is active in “3,074 jurisdictions in 50 states, 4 territories and
Washington D.C.”171 In these jurisdictions, any individual who is arrested
has his identifying information run through the Department of Homeland
Security’s database so that the federal government can determine whether
the individual is in violation of immigration laws. If an individual is
deemed to be an immigration law violator, ICE may authorize the local
agency to detain that individual for up to forty-eight hours, at which time
ICE must either claim custody of the individual or the individual is
released.172
The Secure Communities program has generated a number of
concerns. First, inaccuracies in the DHS database have resulted in a
number of false arrests, including the arrest and detention of U.S. citizens
and noncitizens lawfully present.173
Early studies of the Secure
Communities program also suggest that discriminatory policing of Latinos
has tended to increase in certain jurisdictions when they begin their

NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Apr. 2010), http://www.nilc.org/287g-OIG-report-2010-04-29.html.
171
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED JURISDICTION 1 (August
22, 2012), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf.
172
See Secure Communities: Frequently Asked Questions, How Does Secure
Communities Work?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/faq.htm (last visited June 4, 2012)
(“When state and local law enforcement officers arrest and book someone into custody for a
violation of a criminal offense, they generally fingerprint the person . . . . DHS receives
these fingerprints from the FBI, so that ICE can determine if that person is also subject to
removal (deportation) . . . . In cases where the person appears from these checks to be
removable, ICE may issue a detainer on the person, requesting that the state or local jail
facility hold the individual no more than an extra 48 hours (excluding weekends and
holidays) to allow for an interview of the person.”). Interestingly, there is no statutory
authority for these detainers outside of the context of drug crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)
(2006) (authorizing detainers “for a violation of controlled substances laws” only).
173
AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. OF LAW & SOC. POL’Y,
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS
2 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_
Numbers.pdf (“Approximately 3,600 United States citizens have been arrested by ICE
through the Secure Communities program.”).
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participation in the program.174 In combination with the toxic rhetoric of
the contemporary immigration debate, it is unsurprising that some law
enforcement officers feel that it is their duty to more vigorously police
populations that they identify as potentially “illegal.” As a consequence,
poor Latinos and individuals living in immigrant communities are
increasingly likely to be stopped, arrested, and detained for low-level state
and local criminal offenses as they are caught up in an informal dragnet
aimed at immigration violators.175 On the other hand, the federal
government maintains that the program has the ability to reduce profiling
precisely because it eliminates state and local law enforcement discretion in
immigration enforcement, and relies solely on federal screening for
immigration enforcement decisions.176 This is plausible in theory, although
it is apparently not yet a reality in practice.
In short, state and local governments are now actively participating in
the enforcement of federal immigration law. In some cases, they are doing
so because they erroneously believe that they have the inherent authority to
do so. Increasingly, they are doing so at the behest of the federal
government, sometimes even when they are not interested in dedicating
their law enforcement resources to these efforts.177 The involvement of
174

Id. at 3 (arguing that early data provides support for allegations that Secure
Communities has increased racial profiling, but noting that additional study is needed).
175
Id. at 6 (concluding that in some jurisdictions, Latinos are disproportionately
“target[ed] . . . for minor violations and pre-textual arrests with the actual goal of initiating
immigration checks through the Secure Communities system”); see also Letter from Thomas
E. Perez, supra note 89, at 3 (describing racial profiling in immigration policing by the
Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor of East Haven at 9 (Dec. 19, 2011),
available at www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf
(describing racial profiling in immigration policing by the EHPD). A variety of immigrants’
rights organizations and academics have compiled reports that include descriptions of
policing strategies that target Latinos and Latino neighborhoods. See, e.g., WEISSMAN ET
AL., THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS 8 (2009),
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf;
SARAH WHITE & SALMUN KAZEROUNIAN, TENN. IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL.,
THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTION: RACIAL PROFILING AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN
BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE 6 (2011), available at http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/
The%20Forgotten%20Constitution.pdf.
176
Secure Communities: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2012)
(“Secure Communities reduces opportunities for racial or ethnic profiling because all people
booked into jails are fingerprinted.”) (emphasis in original).
177
DHS has clearly stated that it is a “fact” that jurisdictions cannot opt out of the
program. See Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR.
& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last
visited June 4, 2012). The agency has maintained this position even when confronted with
representatives from jurisdictions that have been skeptical of or hostile to the program. See,
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literally hundreds of thousands of additional law enforcement agents in the
policing of immigration substantially widens the net that the government is
using to catch immigration violators. In the short term, at least, this has
compounded the policing problems that aggressive immigration
enforcement has generated in the past.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: OVERCRIMINALIZATION?
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that there has been an
increased criminalization of immigration in recent years.
Federal
prosecutions of immigration are at all-time record highs, and immigration
offenses are now the single most commonly prosecuted federal criminal
offenses. State and local governments now are assisting actively in federal
immigration enforcement efforts. Moreover, states and localities are
attempting to regulate immigration through their own laws, which routinely
include criminal ordinances.
Aggregate per capita expenditure on law enforcement by local, state,
and federal governments remained flat—and even fell slightly when
adjusted for inflation—in the period from 2002 through 2007.178 At the
federal level, per capita expenditures for judicial and legal services declined
7% in this period, as did per capita expenditure on corrections, while per
capita expenditure on protection fell 2%.179 Yet during this period,
expenditures on immigration enforcement expanded significantly, meaning
that such expenditures have put even further fiscal pressure on other
enforcement efforts and on other government programs. It is difficult to

e.g., Brian Bennett, Deportations Won’t Require States’ OK, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at
AA2 (reporting that DHS informed governors that they could not opt out of the program,
notwithstanding the fact that “Governors in California, Illinois, Massachusetts and several
other states have complained that the effort also has ensnared thousands of minor offenders,
including some who were arrested but not yet tried or convicted, and has deterred some
crime victims from coming forward to aid police” and “[s]everal governors had announced
their intention to withdraw from the program [or] refused to sign agreements”).
Notwithstanding the absence of opt-out provisions, some jurisdictions have continued to
seek ways to limit their participation in the program. See, e.g., Liz Farmer, D.C. Council
Bucking ICE’s Secure Communities, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/2011/11/dc-council-bucking-ices-secure-communities/
120394 (discussing Washington D.C.’s efforts to enact similar limitations); Santa Clara
County Ends Collaboration with ICE, NEW AM. MEDIA (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://newamericamedia.org/2011/10/santa-clara-county-ends-collaboration-with-ice.php
(discussing Santa Clara County’s efforts to limit cooperation by limiting the detainer
individuals flagged by the database check).
178
TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982–2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2011),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf.
179
Id.

648

JENNIFER M. CHACÓN

[Vol. 102

determine exactly what is happening on the state level, but similar trends
are probably emerging in states with an active immigration-enforcement
agenda. Several scholars have recently noted that states have moved to
focus scarce criminal justice resources on traditional criminal justice
areas.180 Yet this is happening at a time when states and localities are
aiming new criminal sanctions and new enforcement efforts at unauthorized
migration. So surely, in at least some places, a shift in law enforcement
resources is occurring.181
The question is whether this constitutes overcriminalization.
Overcriminalization occurs when a legislature defines too many different
activities as “crime,” when the system excessively punishes offenses, or
both. Scholars have condemned the U.S. criminal justice system for both
punishing too much conduct and punishing conduct too harshly, and the
word “overcriminalization” is frequently applied to U.S. criminal law and
law enforcement.182 In a system characterized by overcriminalization, law
enforcement operates with an undesirable degree of unchecked discretion,
procedural protections are undercut, and scarce resources are misallocated
in crime control efforts.183
All of the major problems associated with overcriminalization appear
180

Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 610–11 (2011);
Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 581, 583 (2012).
181
See Lacey, Sex Crimes Were Ignored, supra note 85 (discussing the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Department’s failure to prosecute sex crimes); Robbins, supra note 130 (discussing
the general decline in felony prosecutions along the southern border with the rise of
misdemeanor illegal entry prosecutions).
182
See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 3 (2008) (“The two most distinctive characteristics of both federal and state systems of
criminal justice in the United States during the past several years are the dramatic expansion
in the substantive criminal law and the extraordinary rise in the use of punishment.”);
Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 157, 158 (1967); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–18 (2001). For some efforts to define “overcriminalization” more
precisely, see, for example, Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) (“[T]he
common features of overcriminalization include the following: (1) excessive unchecked
discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among similarly situated
persons, (3) potential for abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other
significant values and evade significant procedural protections, and (5) misdirection of
scarce resources (opportunity costs).”); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005) (“[T]he overcriminalization phenomenon consists of: (1)
untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend culpability; (4)
crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6)
excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty violations.”).
183
See Beale, supra note 182, at 749; Luna, supra note 182, at 717.
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in contemporary immigration enforcement. By imposing criminal law
solutions on what is (and has always been) primarily an issue of labor
migration flow,184 legislatures have not only failed to address the central
dynamics that drive migration,185 but have also created a series of
undesirable and expensive byproducts. The failure of the policies of
criminalization is evident in the numbers. Although harsh criminal
enforcement of immigration laws may be having a marginal effect on
migration flows,186 any such effect has come at huge cost and could likely
have been attained through more effective migration policy outside of the
criminal sphere.
First, there is the monetary cost. The resources meted out to achieve
the criminal punishment of migrants are disproportionate to the problem
and corrosive to the overall balance of resources in the criminal justice
system. As previously noted, the cost of immigration enforcement is
crowding out other investments in criminal justice, particularly during a
time of scarce resources. Whether through deliberate policy choices or
through the necessity of allocating scarce resources, the current immigration
enforcement agenda skews spending toward the prosecution of migration
offenders and away from the prosecution of violent and dangerous

184

BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION AND MEXICAN
MIGRATION 9–28 (2010) (discussing the labor market effects of NAFTA, including the
production of increased unauthorized labor flow from Mexico); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING
THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS
119 (2007) (“It is unquestionably the case that economic forces bring the majority of
migrants to the United States. Many come to this country for economic opportunities far
superior to those available to them in their homeland.”); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, BEYOND
SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 21–23
(2002) (theorizing market expansion as the driving force behind international migration).
185
For useful discussions of mechanisms for regularizing and regulating migration flow
that focus on the underlying economic realities of international migration, see, for example,
HING, supra note 184, at 133–60 (proposing more complete North American economic
integration); MASSEY, supra note 184, at 142–64.
186
See BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 93, at 34 (finding no
measurable impacts of enforcement on migration flow); PASSEL & COHN, supra note 93
(citing enforcement as one factor in the slight reductions in migration flow, but also noting
the importance of the economic slowdown in the U.S.). No effort is made in these studies to
disaggregate the use of criminal prosecutions from other enforcement mechanisms, including
increased workplace document screening and increased document inspection at the border.
Hence, it is presently impossible to determine whether criminal enforcement has had any
significant effect on migration flow. But would-be migrants who are undeterred by the very
real and well-known threats of robbery, serious violence, rape, sexual assault, and death in
the desert in the course of northward migration seem likely to give very little weight to the
possibility of criminal sanctions when deciding whether to undertake the journey. Clearly,
for some, the forces that compel migration are powerful enough to overcome even the most
severe criminal sanctions they might face.
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crimes.187
Moreover, converting immigration enforcement into a criminal
problem has resulted in several harms that are classically understood as
symptoms of overcriminalization. One harm is racial profiling. Because
immigration status is impossible to determine at a glance, officials who are
enforcing immigration laws without knowledge of a particular individual’s
status are necessarily relying on profiling—and particularly the racial
profiling of those of “Mexican appearance” that courts have judicially
sanctioned in immigration enforcement188—to make stops and arrests for
immigration violations. As state-level criminal sanctions aimed directly at
migrants continue to proliferate, the number of actors making these racereliant stops will increase, and racial profiling will increase as well. The
Supreme Court’s refusal to uphold the preliminary injunction of Section 2
of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, which authorizes state and local officials’
investigations into immigration status, ensures that in Arizona and other
states, sub-federal actors will be actively engaged in immigration policing.
Available data already establishes that many investigators are
disproportionately stopping and arresting Latinos for various other lowlevel criminal offenses in an effort to catch noncitizens in the immigration
enforcement dragnet. Indeed, one of the lead charges against Latinos in
counties with 287(g) programs is “driving without a license”—a charge that
cannot even be established until a stop is made. The fact that such charges
against Latinos have risen drastically and in ways that are completely out of
proportion to the presence of Latinos in the general population suggests that
immigration enforcement is a driving force in the rise of misdemeanor
charges against Latinos.189 In this way, the criminalization of migration
also has fueled the overcriminalization of misdemeanors committed by a
particular racial group. Unless and until more restrictive guidelines on the
use of race are promulgated and the proliferation of migration-related

187

See Lacey, Sex Crimes Were Ignored, supra note 90; Robbins, supra note 130.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. 543, 564 n.17 (1976) (“[T]o the extent that
the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this checkpoint, that reliance clearly
is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served.” (citation omitted)); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (accepting “Mexican appearance” as a relevant
factor in immigration policing); see also CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2
(2003) (allowing reliance on race as “a factor” in immigration and national security
enforcement while ruling it out in other kinds of criminal investigations). See generally
Jennifer M. Chacón, supra note 94 (discussing these and other cases that have eviscerated
Fourth Amendment protections in the immigration context).
189
See, e.g., TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING
IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 5–7 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu
/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf; WEISSMAN ET AL., supra note 175, at 27–29.
188
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offenses decreases, it is all but certain that the recent and rapid rise in
Latino incarceration will continue.
In addition to the procedural harms generated by profiling, a distinct
set of procedural harms has accrued as a result of the “streamlined”
procedural mechanisms used to obtain convictions for illegal entry and
felony reentry. In criminal courts along the southern border, illegal entry
pleas are counseled only nominally, with six to ten defendants pleading at a
time with the assistance of one public defender.190 The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure concerning plea agreements are routinely and
systematically violated in these procedures.191 Disparate sentences for
identically situated defendants are meted out for illegal reentry, depending
on where a defendant happens to be apprehended.192 And as different states
enact differing criminal provisions as a form of indirect regulation of
migration, the disparate interstate treatment of individuals whose only
genuine offense is presence without authorization will increase.
“[T]he criminal sanction should be reserved for specific behaviors and
mental states that are so wrongful and harmful to their direct victims or the
general public as to justify the official condemnation and denial of freedom
that flow from a guilty verdict.”193 At the moment, nearly half of federal
prosecutions target noncitizens whose only crime is their decision to act on
their desire to work and live in a place that affords greater opportunity for
themselves and for their children. Our society certainly faces costs and
challenges associated with unauthorized migration and should work to forge
policies that effectively address the issue. But reliance on the criminal law
is not the solution and generates many new problems, including racial
profiling, unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants, overreliance
on (expensive) incarceration, and the underemphasis of other, more
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important law enforcement goals.
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